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Abstract
Mobile devices are widely used for uploading/downloading media files such as
audio, video and images to/from the remote servers. These devices have limited
resources and are required to oﬄoad resource-consuming media processing tasks
to the clouds for further processing. Migration of these tasks means that the
media services provided by the clouds need to be authentic and trusted by the
mobile users. The existing schemes for secure exchange of media files between
the mobile devices and the clouds have limitations in terms of memory support,
processing load, battery power, and data size. These schemes lack the support
for large-sized video files and are not suitable for resource-constrained mobile de-
vices. This paper proposes a secure, lightweight, robust, and efficient scheme for
data exchange between the mobile users and the media clouds. The proposed
scheme considers High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC) Intra-encoded video
streams in unsliced mode as a source for data hiding. Our proposed scheme
aims to support real-time processing with power-saving constraint in mind. Ad-
vanced Encryption Standard (AES) is used as a base encryption technique by
our proposed scheme. The simulation results clearly show that the proposed
scheme outperforms AES-256 by decreasing the processing time up to 4.76%
and increasing the data size up to 0.72% approximately. The proposed scheme
can readily be applied to real-time cloud media streaming.
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1. Introduction
Mobile communication plays a vital role in our daily lives and has seen an
unprecedented technological growth over the past two decades. Apart from using
mobile devices for basic telecommunication services such as messaging and voice,
an increasing number of customers is using their phones for sharing multimedia
data by taking pictures and capturing videos. As a result, a huge amount of data
is generated by mobile users all the time. According to the latest Cisco report,
the data generated by mobile users grew up to 69% in 2014 with 2.5 exabytes
per month at the end of 2014. During this period, 4G connections produced
10 times more data traffic as compared to non-4G connections. The expected
growth of data traffic in 4G connections is shown in Figure 11. The vertical
axis represents data in units of exabytes whereas horizontal axis represents the
years.
Figure 1: Cisco Forecast for Mobile Data Traffic
Although, the storage capacity of mobile devices has improved significantly,
it still cannot meet the ever-increasing demands of mobile users. Cloud plat-
1C. V. N. I. Cisco, Global mobile data traffic forecast up date, 2014-2019, white paper.
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forms facilitate mobile users by storing their data remotely in media clouds and
retrieving later at any point of time. Therefore, they provide an ease for mobile
users with an option to enhance their virtual storage [36] as shown in Figure
2. Accessing the data over wireless channels from media clouds has gained pop-
ularity among the mobile users, primarily due to the development of various
multimedia applications [42]. However, transmission of private data over wire-
less links is prone to various security breaches. As a result, security provisioning
has become a major concern for data residing over the media clouds [35]. As
the data can be transferred and stored on a cloud system through wireless links,
it is vulnerable to alteration, unauthorized disclosure, and replay attacks [32].
Trust of the users need to be guaranteed while they upload their multimedia and
secret data to different clouds. Although, there are existing approaches which
provide a facility to share secret information among a number of authorized
users, such approaches are applied on simple form of data [6, 13]. In case of
videos, especially the large-sized videos, such approaches have limitations pri-
marily due to the data size and the processing capability of end-user’s devices.
As a result, lightweight but secured schemes need to be designed.
The growing popularity of High Definition (HD) videos and the emergence
of HD and beyond-HD formats such as 4k×2k or 8k×4k resolutions are creating
a benchmark for visual quality [30]. The High Efficiency Video Coding (HEVC)
is an emerging standard to deal with such high resolution multimedia contents
[4]. This standard provides three basic modes for encoding multimedia contents,
i.e., Intra, low-delay and random. The intra mode treats each video frame as
an independent image and focuses on quality rather than compression. This
mode contains only I-frames and is suitable for the applications including video
surveillance and live high-quality video conferences, where no compromise on
visual quality can be made. The low-delay mode provides more compression
with a compromise on visual quality and provides approximately 33% reduction
in bit rate. This mode is a combination of I and P-frames and is suitable for
those online applications where compromise on visual quality can be made. An
application of the low-delay mode is online gaming, which is usually played on
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Figure 2: Mobile Data Storage
mobile devices with low resolutions. The random mode is a combination of I,
P and B-frames with a facility to access any part of a frame. This mode offers
better compression as compared to the low-delay mode and is mainly used for
contents storage with almost 31% reduction in bit rate [33].
As a result of the above distinguishing features of HEVC standard, re-
searchers are focusing on developing security techniques which may utilize the
encoded contents produced by HEVC standard. Such techniques not only re-
quire an analysis of HEVC-produced contents for data protection but also de-
mand authorization by exchanging a key as shown in Figure 3. Security is of
utmost importance especially when videos are uploaded to public clouds and
later on retrieved by the users. Various encryption algorithms are proposed
to protect the video sequences against unauthorized attacks by malicious users
who use third-party tools and methods to steal the transmitted video sequences
[41, 40]. However, these algorithms focus only on restricting the video access
but do not provide any facility to secure secret data hidden in those videos.
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Furthermore, the specific requirements of mobile users such as processing ca-
pability, hardware resources, and power backup are ignored while downloading
and uploading their multimedia data to the public clouds.
Figure 3: Traditional Security Scheme
Our research has the following major contributions.
1. The HD videos always contain redundant information. If these videos
are encoded in Intra domain, the compression is too low for maintaining
the visual quality. As a result of low compression, there is always an
abundant space available for hiding secret information. We propose a
cryptographic algorithm by using Intra-encoded HD video sequences in
public clouds. Although it introduces a slight overhead of executing the
proposed cryptographic algorithm on the input video sequence, it is still
implementable on latest mobile devices.
2. The encrypted videos are shared on a public cloud, which is semi-trusted.
If an intruder downloads the video and steals the Private Key (PRK) and
Public Key (PUK), it will only be able to decrypt the videos rather than
the encrypted secret data. The decryption process can only be performed
by an authentic user having a Secret Key (SK). Moreover, the targeted
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users are always mobile users, located at different geographic locations
across the globe. Our proposed approach supports mobility of the users
by authenticating them remotely.
3. Our proposed approach is a combination of PRK, PUK, and SK and does
not require continuous synchronization among the users as shown in Figure
4. The responsibilities of an uploading user is to encrypt and upload the
data and the video on the cloud along with broadcasting an announcement
to all authorized users that a new data has been uploaded. Afterwards,
it is the choice of the other authorized users whether they want to down-
load and decrypt the secret data, embedded in the uploaded videos. By
possessing the same SK, they can download and fully decrypt the hidden
data at any time.
4. The proposed approach works efficiently in public clouds by providing the
required security level and at the same time eliminating the cost of having
private clouds. Our proposed approach efficiently utilizes the computa-
tional power of cloud resources by partially completing the decryption
process. As a result, the delay occurring in the decryption process can
be minimized at the receiver’s side. Since, our proposed scheme targets
mobile users, it is not necessary for the receivers to have enough compu-
tational resources.
The main purpose of the public clouds is to provide enough storage and
computational power to the users. Therefore, cloud environments are ideal for
processing and storing HD videos. Our proposed scheme increases the com-
pressed video size up to 0.72% on average, as compared to the other state-of-
the-art techniques which increase the size up to 9% or higher in some cases [23].
Although our approach affects the size of the transmitted binary video data,
the variation of size is relatively small and can easily be ignored as compared
to the existing techniques. This variation mainly depends on the quantity of
encrypted data. If the quantity is not too large, the increase in size will not
be noticeable. This is contrary to the existing approaches, where the increase
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Figure 4: Updated Security Scheme
in size is relatively higher. Although we target HD videos in this paper, our
proposed approach is equally applicable to any other resolution of the videos.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, related work
from literature is presented. In Section 3, our proposed approach is explained
in detail, followed by simulation setup and results in Section 4. Finally, the
paper is concluded in Section 5.
2. Related Work
Mobile devices such as smartphones and tablets are becoming an indispens-
able part of our lives for entertainment and convenient communication. With the
increasing popularity of various mobile devices, there is a phenomenal growth
in the development of mobile applications such as email, web browsing, mo-
bile games, terrestrial navigation, mobile health care, and social networking.
These applications indicate that mobile devices are quickly becoming the dom-
inant computing platforms for the provisioning of seamless connectivity and
entertainment regardless of the user’s mobility. Mobile devices, on the other
hand, are still restricted in terms of their resources such as computational ca-
pabilities, storage, and battery life time. Furthermore, they have limited com-
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munication resources such as available bandwidth and connectivity [5]. The
resource-constrained nature of these devices limits the support for developing
various mobile applications. Mobile Cloud Computing (MCC) has resolved the
problem associated with the resource availability of these devices. The MCC
allows mobile devices to oﬄoad computationally-complex and space-demanding
tasks to the clouds [44, 45]. Clouds, on the other hand, have ample resources
and provide an ideal platform for resource-consuming mobile applications such
as speech recognition and video encoding/decoding [9, 37]. Many other similar
applications need to be oﬄoaded to the clouds for processing and utilizing the
huge amount of resources available with these clouds. Computational oﬄoading
of these applications saves energy and improves the performance of mobile ap-
plications [8, 11]. Moreover, the MCC enables the mobile users to store/access
major portion of their data on the cloud using wireless networks. This feature
of MCC enables mobile devices to utilize their storage and processing power
efficiently [7].
The on-demand nature of cloud computing faces various security threats
such as data loss, data leakage, Denial-of-Service (DoS), account or service traf-
fic hijacking, and malicious insiders. A malevolent hacker may modify critical
data due to a careless cloud service provider. To tackle such risk, the important
data needs to be encrypted and the encryption keys must be protected [20, 1].
If an intruder gains access to a customer credentials stored on a cloud, it may
eavesdrop on transactions and activities, maliciously manipulates the data, re-
turns falsified information, and may redirect the customer to illicit sites. DoS
attack is another major concern for cloud platforms because most of the orga-
nizations are dependent on 24/7 availability of one or more services [20]. Denial
of one or more services may be costly to the customers especially, when they
are billed based on disk-space consumption and computation cycles. Account
or service hijacking is another major threat faced by cloud platforms. Hijacking
a service allows a malicious person to sneak into crucial and sensitive areas of
a deployed service which may lead to breaching the integrity, availability, and
confidentiality of that service. A malicious insider, e.g., a current or former em-
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ployee, a business partner, or a contractor, may gain access to the data, network
or system for malicious purposes [1]. The situation gets worse when the cloud
service provider is solely responsible for data security.
Cloud platforms attract more attacks due to their distributed nature. It is
desirable that the data (video contents in this context) is protected and may
only be accessed in encrypted form. Directly hiding the data in encrypted
HEVC video streams to intact its quality can avoid the leakage of video con-
tents. This feature of data hiding can address the security and privacy concerns
associated with the cloud computing [19, 24]. A cloud server has the ability
to embed the additional information about a video such as video notation and
data authentication, into an encrypted version of HEVC format. Once the data
is hidden, the server can verify the integrity without knowing the original con-
tents. As a result, security and privacy of the encrypted data is preserved. In
literature, various studies exist on encrypting the data in videos. A novel en-
cryption method for Intra and Inter frames in MPEG videos is presented in [38].
The authors argued that highly sensitive and private videos require encrypting
the whole video. Therefore, not only the Intra frames, but the Inter frames
were also required to be encrypted. In [39], an encryption scheme for MPEG
videos is proposed. The proposed scheme was based on Advanced Encryption
Standard-128 bit (AES-128) algorithm. Only Intra frames of a particular video
were encrypted because the Inter frames are useless without knowing the corre-
sponding Intra frames associated with them. In [25], a novel scheme based on
selective encryption for H.264 data is presented. The proposed scheme ensured
a transparent encryption and protection against various attacks. The proposed
encryption and decryption was relatively faster at the time of preserving the
formation and length of the video streams.
Various clouds such as Google App Engine and Amazon web services have
experienced security threats during recent years. These security flaws are ex-
ploited by illegal users to steal either secret information or disturb the normal
operation of Internet. As a result, robust and lightweight authentication and
authorization schemes are required for the devices interacting with the cloud
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platforms. Cloud computing is a variant of client-server architecture model,
where, thousands of clients use the same infrastructure at a lot larger scales.
Identity and access control management is a core requirement for cloud com-
puting [14, 18]. Therefore, stronger authentication is required as compared to
conventional client-server interaction model. In [46], the authors proposed a
cloud-assisted privacy preserving key management scheme for mobile attacks.
Their proposed scheme protected patient’s identity and location information.
Moreover, the proposed scheme did not take into account the key privacy and
updating. Hence, their scheme was not suitable for a real-time cloud computing
platform. Bilinear pairing in an elliptic curve has recently gained attention in
developing an ID-based cryptosystem [12, 31]. This cryptosystem solved the
high cost issue of authentication and public key management derived from tra-
ditional public key cryptosystems. The identity of each user was used as a public
key. Therefore, a user did not require extra computational cost for verifying the
public keys of the other users. Moreover, no extra storage space at the user’s
device was required to store public keys and corresponding certificates of the
other users.
Recently, several studies have applied ID-based cryptosystems in various
cloud environments. In [43], a new ID-based authentication scheme is de-
signed for cloud environment. Although the proposed scheme was suitable for
a distributed mobile cloud service environment, it lacked the support for user
anonymity and untraceability. Most of the authentication schemes which are
based on elliptic curve or bilinear pairing [12, 31] are designed for client-server
environment. They are not feasible for direct application to distributed service
environments, where multiple service providers compete with each other for
provisioning of various services. The user needs to manage multiple secret keys
learned from each service provider. To resolve this issue, all service providers
need to share the same secret key. However, if an adversary acquires the secret
key, it may pose as a legitimate service provider to deceive the users. Moreover,
an intruder who captures the secret key may acquire the session keys as well. Af-
ter acquiring one or more session keys, the attacker may eavesdrop on sensitive
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information transmitted between the user and another service provider.
3. Proposed Approach
In this section, we present our proposed data hiding scheme, which is a
combination of PRK, PUK and SK. The underlying encryption algorithms used
by our proposed scheme are modified AES-256 bit and RSA [10, 16]. The
modified AES-256 executes at the user’s side while the RSA executes at the
cloud’s side. The cloud generates a pair of PRK and PUK. The PRK remains
at the cloud’s side while the PUK is sent to the user for encryption purpose.
Our proposed scheme is applied directly to HEVC-encoded video stream. In
general, this scheme has three major phases, i.e., HEVC video encoding, video
and secret data encryption, half decryption and full decryption with the secret
data extraction. The uploading user, also known as data owner, first encodes
the video, encrypts the secret data using SK, adjusts the encrypted data into
encoded video, and then encrypts the video using PUK to generate an encrypted
HEVC Encoded Video Stream (HEVS). Next, the owner uploads the encrypted
HEVS over the public cloud, where the cloud sources decrypt the video using
the PRK, a technique known as half decryption. The cloud sources have no
knowledge about the data hidden in the video stream. The receiver downloads
the video, decrypts it using SK, extracts the required data and then either
keeps or discards the video stream. The overall process of the proposed scheme
is shown in Figures 5a and 5b.
3.1. Video Encoding and Data Encryption
An HD video usually contains N frames, where N is a positive integer. It
is to be noted here that, for real-time processing, it is not possible to process
and encode an entire video sequence in one go. Moreover, HEVC codec and
HD videos require enough hardware resources and computing power. As our
targeted users are mobile users, the above limitations need to be considered
before starting an encoding process. A simple solution to deal these limitations
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(a) Encoding and Encryption (b) Decryption and/or Decoding
Figure 5: Encryption and Decryption Process
is to reduce the total number of frames for encoding. Apart from encoding
limitations, it is not compulsory to encrypt entire HEVS. The encryption of
an entire HEVS increases the computations and time cost which also affect
the format of the HEVS. One simple solution for these later limitations is to
nominate a part of HEVS for encryption in order to enhance the security level.
To keep the format of the HEVS undisturbed, it is safe to encrypt the secret
data in Spatial Information (SI). The Motion Vectors (MVs) information can
also be utilized for this purpose.
In this paper, HEVS-based encryption scheme is proposed which is time-
efficient, less complex in terms of computations, and does not disturb the format
of HEVS. After encoding the HD video using the standard settings in HEVC
codec, three main parts in HEVS can easily be utilized to encrypt the secret
data, i.e., the SI, the MVs, and Intra Prediction Modes Information (IPMI). As
compared to [34], our proposed scheme encrypts the secret data in compressed
domain, not in the encoding domain. This feature makes it easy to apply our
scheme directly to modify the HEVS. Modified versions of AES have already
been applied on H.264/AVC codec-based encoded video streams [26]. The simi-
larity among our proposed scheme and those presented in [26, 34] is the usage of
modified AES for data encryption purpose. Our proposed scheme differs from
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[26, 34] in the sense that we are using HEVC/H.265 codec while they have used
H.264. The former codec is the latest one while the latter is the previous ver-
sion. We are using the HD videos, which have high resolution and difficult to
deal with, while they have used low resolution videos. In this paper, we have
used modified AES-256 bit algorithm along with PUK and cloud computing to
make it more secure and computationally less complex. The entire computa-
tional process of our modified AES is same as the original one, except one main
change. In the original implementation of AES, there are four processes involve
in the transformation phase, i.e. SubBytes(), ShiftRows(), MixColumns(), and
AddRoundKey(). In all these four processes, the MixColumns() is the highly
computational one. In our modified AES version, we have replaced the Mix-
Columns() with Permutations() process. The Permutations() process does not
affect the entire structure of the AES but reduces its computational time sig-
nificantly. As our target is mobile users, we cannot expect high computational
power, especially the capacity to perform long matrix multiplications, from their
mobile devices. The Permutations() process helps us to achieve this goal of low
processing. We encrypt the secret data by distributing it into three parts, i.e.,
first part in the SI, second part in the MVs and the third part in the IPMI,
in order to make the compressed HEVS format consistent. After encryption,
the HEVS can still be decoded perfectly with any latest version of HEVC codec
without showing any visible difference in the decoded videos. The procedure
to encrypt secret data in nominated sections of HEVS is very complicated and
requires deep knowledge of HEVC encoder. A minor mistake can disturb the
HEVS format, and ultimately alert the decoder resulting in either crashing of
the decoder or format mismatch errors.
3.1.1. Encryption in Spatial Information
To increase the security level, the secret data is divided equally into three
parts. The first part is encrypted in the Spatial Information (SI). The SI con-
siders the luminance plane information of pixels in the frames of a video. This
information is always computed for the entire video sequence [22]. The HD
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videos are encoded in Intra domain, so plenty of spatial information is available
to utilize. This phase summarizes the embedding of secret data in the SI. In
H.264 and H.265/HEVC standards, the entropy coding is used to encode the
quantized coefficient values of the SI [2]. The main difference is that, in HEVC,
only CABAC version is used while in H.264, both CABAC and CALVC are
used. The details of CABAC and CALVC frameworks can be found in [27, 28].
The CABAC framework has three main parts, i.e., binarization, context mod-
eling, and Binary Arithmetic Coding (BAC). We skip the detailed explanation
of these three parts, as it is out of the scope of this paper. Next, we encode
the HD videos in Intra domain, where the data compression is very low. As a
result, we do not fully utilize the CABAC and our only focus is on the BAC but
at a lower level.
The BAC is based on Least Probable Symbol (LPS) and Most Probable
Symbol (MPS) rules and is adopted from Shannon-Fano coding [21]. The cal-
culations of LPS and MPS are based on a probability, i.e., by dividing the
possibility of occurrences of a symbol within a predefined interval, usually de-
noted by R. The first half of R, i.e., [0, 0.5] reserves the probability of LPS
while the second half, i.e., [0.6, 1] reserves the probability of MPS. The interval
[0.5, 0.6] is considered as neutral and the symbols occurring in this interval can
either be treated as LPS or MPS. Based on LPS and MPS, we utilize each byte
of zero video data to encrypt the secret data. The secret data is first encrypted
through modified AES-256 SK. Then, the encrypted secret data is converted
into bytes. Next, a 2’s complement operation is performed on encrypted secret
data’s bytes. Finally, the negated bytes are added with zero bytes of the video.
In that way, the format and the number of bits in video’s data bytes will remain
in the same order. Moreover, the original pattern can easily be extracted back
at the receiver end by converting those modified video’s data bytes into zeros
using a simple subtraction operation.
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3.1.2. Encryption in Motion Vectors
The Motion Vectors (MVs) play an important role in video coding, especially
in Inter and Random access modes. They are the key elements in the motion
estimation process during video encoding/compression. In general, they are
used to represent a block of pixels in current video frame, based on the position
of same block of pixels in the reference video frame2. In the case of Intra mode,
blocks of pixels are used to reference other blocks but within the same frame.
This type of referencing is known as Intra prediction. Basically, the MVs are
used to track moving regions and objects. Based on that motion information,
compression and information discarding procedure is performed in video coding
to keep the texture information of different objects in a video frame.
The HEVC codec can encode MVs with much better precision and less resid-
ual errors. The main reason behind this accuracy is the Intra prediction direc-
tions. In our scheme, there are 35 Intra prediction directions while in H.264
standard, only 9 directions are present. As stated above, only CABAC version
of entropy coding is available in HEVC, so CABAC is used to encode calcu-
lated MVs for transmission purpose. After encoding through CABAC, the MVs
transform into codewords. Each codeword is a combination of binary 1s and 0s
and its length increases with the increasing number of MVs. The structure of
the codewords is very simple. The most significant bit in the codewords is al-
ways zero. The length of the codewords can easily be calculated using Equation
1.
CL = AZ +Bs (1)
Here, CL represents the codeword length, AZ represents the number of
appended zeros and Bs represents the total number of bits used for binary
presentation of a decimal value. The decimal value indicates the MV number.
The length of the AZ is always “1 less than the Bs” as shown in Equation 2.
2https://hevc.hhi.fraunhofer.de
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LAZ = LBs − 1 (2)
Here, LAZ represents the total length of the appended zeros and LBs rep-
resents the length of total number of bits, respectively. For example, if a MV is
represented by decimal number 13, then its equivalent binary representation is
1101. As this binary representation contains 4 bits, 3 zeros will be appended at
the most significant place. As a result, the total number of bits will become 7,
which is length of the codeword used to represent that specific MV.
From the above discussion, it is obvious that the most significant part of a
codeword is always zero. Therefore, it can easily be utilized to hide the second
part of the encrypted data by using the same procedure, as followed in section
3.1.1. This procedure maintains the order and format of the codewords.
3.1.3. Encryption of Intra Prediction Mode Information
In H.264 standard, three types of Intra coding modes are supported, i.e.,
Intra 4 × 4, Intra 8 × 8, and Intra 16 × 16 [29]. However, in case of HEVC,
there are N Intra coding modes, ranging from Intra 2× 2 to Intra 64× 64 [15].
To perform compression and prediction in H.264 standard, the video frames are
divided into blocks of equal sizes, also known as macroblocks (MBs). To provide
better accuracy, the concept of MBs is replaced by Coding Tree Unit (CTU)
in HEVC. To make the encoding process fast and simple, Intra 32 × 32 and
Intra 64×64 block sizes are selected. The intra prediction is used to recover the
lost information of a block of pixels from its surrounding blocks. Both in H.264
and H.265, the video frames are divided into sub-blocks during the encoding
process. The intra prediction modes help the encoder to estimate which parts
of the current video frame are flat. The Intra Prediction Mode Information
(IPMI) is always available in the header of the video block. The header also
specifies the patterns, used to perform encoding process. The IPMI is encoded
through CABAC to be transformed into codewords. The codewords creation
follows the same criteria as described in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2. A noticeable
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feature in these codewords is that the encoding patterns in consecutive blocks
are always same for luma and chroma components [17]. Therefore, two options
are available for hiding the third part of the encrypted data. Either, the most
significant zero bits are used or one of the coding pattern in consecutive blocks
is used. In order to keep the same pattern, we use the most significant zeros
to embed the third and last part of the encrypted data by applying the same
procedure as followed before in sections 3.1.1 and 3.1.2.
3.2. Half Decryption
As stated earlier, the data owner encrypts and uploads the data on the
cloud. The application system on the cloud provides three major services, i.e.,
Secure Storage Space (SSS), Key Generator (KG), and Half Decryption Function
(HDF). The user uploads the encrypted videos on the cloud through KG, which
stores the uploaded videos in the SSS. Before storing the encrypted videos in
the SSS, they are decrypted by HDF. In order to run such an application system
over the public clouds, few assumptions are made:
1. The main purpose behind the concept of public clouds is that they should
be used freely with a trust factor. Although it is obvious that cloud owner
may see the uploaded contents, it cannot change them. Therefore, it
becomes a responsibility of the encryption scheme to secure the data in
such environments.
2. A user plays dual roles, i.e., a user may upload and download the data.
Therefore, a user may be an owner or a requester.
3. Each user posses the same SK.
4. To protect the data transmission between the user and the cloud over
communication channels, it is assumed that it is protected by a security
protocol, such as SSH.
These assumptions need to be followed carefully. For example, in our first
assumption, if the encryption scheme is not strong enough, it is possible that the
video stream may be hijacked and infected during the transmission between the
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user and the cloud or a malicious user may upload an infected video to get the
control of the application system, running on the cloud. The second assumption
facilitates a user, so that it can download and upload videos at the same time.
Possession of same SK synchronizes the authentic users. In case of multiple
secret keys, the user authentication process will become complicated and the
number of secret keys will increase, as more users become authenticated. To
protect the transmission channel between two end points, the security protocols
are always required. Without such protocols, the transmission channel cannot
be trusted.
Since a public cloud cannot be trusted fully, the KG running over the cloud
generates PRK and PUK. However, it cannot determine the SK of the users.
As the data owner uses PUK, generated by the KG, to encrypt the video, cloud
may only be able to decrypt the video by using the same PUK and its PRK.
This partial decryption reduces the processing load at the receiver’s end. Partial
decryption is the responsibility of HDF. For proper functioning of the system,
each user registers itself with KG by forwarding the user ID. The KG replies
back with a PUK. The user uses this PUK to encrypt its user ID and password
and sends it back to cloud’s application system to request for a login session.
The cloud’s application system replies back with the session information. After
getting the session’s information, the user uses the same PUK to encrypt the
video before uploading it.
3.3. Full Decryption with Data Extraction
When a user requests for a specific data, it sends a request to the KG for
a login session. First, it looks up the authenticated user’s list to search for
a match with the user’s ID. If the user’s ID does not match, it simply drops
the connection. If a match is found, then, first a login session is created in
the similar way, as is shown in section 3.2. In the meanwhile, the KG checks
whether the requested data is available in the SSS or not. If the requested data
is not available, it informs the requester about the unavailability of the data,
otherwise, it sends back the decrypted video to the requester. After getting the
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decrypted video, user decrypts the secret data by using its SK. Upon extracting
the secret data, it is up to the requester to either keep the video stream for
further use or simply discard it.
There are two scenarios for secret data decryption. In the first scenario, the
user is authorized one. In such scenario, the maximum probability is that it
will first decrypt the secret data from video stream and then decide either to
keep or discard it. In the second scenario, the user is unauthorized one, but has
stolen the ID of an authorized user to access the video. In this scenario, the
unauthorized user will be able to decode the video stream but will not be able
to extract the hidden information without having the SK.
3.4. Proposed Algorithm
The step by step explanation of our proposed scheme is as follows.
Step 1: Registration Phase
1. Each MUi forwards its user ID to KG function on the nominated public
cloud.
2. KG authorizes the MUi for uploading/downloading data by forwarding
KG’s generated PUK.
3. The data owner encrypts the user ID and password using the PUK and
sends it back to cloud for login session.
4. The KG replies back with the session information.
Step 2: Encoding Phase
1. Videos are encoded using HEVC codec in Intra mode.
2. This phase results in a Binary File (BF), also known as HEVS.
Step 3: Calculation Phase
1. Total number of blocks (TBs) in the generated BF are calculated.
2. DC/zero Blocks (DCBs) and AC/non-zero blocks (ACBs) are separated
from each other.
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Step 4: Pre-Encryption Phase
1. The AES-256 bit key, known as SK, is generated in the same way, as is
generated in the original implementation.
2. The State matrix is set up.
3. Each Mobile User (MUi) possess the same SK, where i = 1, 2, · · · , n and
MUi is either data owner or requester.
Step 5: Encryption Phase
1. Input : Video frames or Binary Packets
2. The secret data is encrypted through modified AES’s SK and converted
into byte format.
3. 2’s complement of the encrypted secret data is computed.
4. Information about the SI, MV and IPMI is extracted from the frames
header.
5. The encrypted data is added with the extracted information.
6. After adjusting the encrypted data, the HEVS is encrypted by the PUK.
Step 6: Uploading Phase
1. After authorization, data owner (MUi) alerts the KG function that data
is ready for uploading.
2. The KG function acknowledges MUi and starts receiving the data.
Step 7: Half Decryption Phase
1. This step involves cloud computing resources.
2. The encrypted video is decrypted at the cloud to reduce the user’s pro-
cessing load by the HDF.
3. The PRK generated by the KG is used to perform this task.
4. After decrypting the complete data file, the KG stores it in the SSS.
Step 8: Downloading/Decryption Phase
1. The MUi is authenticated.
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2. After authentication, the MUi downloads the required video, decrypts the
secret data, and/or decodes the video by using the SK and/or HEVC
codec, respectively.
4. Simulation Setup and Results
In this section, we present the experimental setup and results of our proposed
scheme. Our scheme is mainly based on modified version of AES-256 but we also
compare our results with other versions of AES and DES. Although AES-128,
AES-192 and DES-56 are also very popular, to assure better security, large-
sized security keys are always preferable and difficult to crack. Table 1 shows a
summarized comparison among AES, 3DES and DES techniques.




112 and 168 56




















2112 and 2168 256
Approximated
Cracking Time
2128: 5 × 1021 years
2192: 7.5× 1032 years




Table 1: Comparison between AES and DES
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All our experiments are performed on Dell machine with processor Intel
CoreTM i5 − 3470 CPU @ 3.20 GHz and having memory 8 GB. For encod-
ing purpose, we use HEVC/H.265 reference software version HM 16.6 with
Intra configuration settings [3]. For simulation dataset, we use standard HD
videos3. We select video sequences, i.e., PeopleOnStreet, Kimono, Cactus, and
Rush Hour, having 2560 × 1600 and 1920 × 1080 resolutions, respectively. The
frame rate of the test videos varies from one video to another. In Table 2, the
details of test sequences used during the experiments are shown. As shown in
the table, the test sequences have different frame rates. Similarly, these se-
quences contain multiple objects which are moving with different velocities. For
testing purpose, we encode first 150 frames from each video sequence. Default
Quantization Parameter (QP) value, i.e. 32, is being followed while encoding
the videos. The Group of Pictures (GOP) is set to 1 because of Intra coding
mode. The proposed technique is applied to Intra-frames, i.e., I-frames, in un-
sliced mode. In case of I-frames, the compression is always low. As a result, we
have enough space available in video frames to hide the data. This techniques
can also be applied to Inter-frames (P or B-frames), both in sliced and unsliced
modes, but it increases computational time of encryption and decryption and
network latency because Inter-frames are always dependent on I-frames. An-
other major issue is that if an I-frame is lost during transmission due to any
reason, all dependent Inter-frames will also get dropped.
For secret dataset, we use standard test images4. We select color images in
bitmap format, i.e., barbara, baboon, lenna, pepper, airplane, BoatsColor, and
goldhill. The resolution of the test images varies from one image to another. In
Table 3, the details of test images used during the experiments are shown. As
shown in the table, the test images have different resolutions.
The encryption algorithm is implemented in Matlab version R2015a. For










PeopleOnStreet 150 150 30 2560×1600
Kimono 240 150 24 1920×1080
Cactus 500 150 50 1920×1080
Rush Hour 500 150 25 1920×1080









Table 3: Details of Test Images
implementation. The current version of Matlab provides Amazon-EC2 cloud
facility with an ease for the researchers to use built-in functions to perform
cloud-based computing. As our aim is real-time processing, we mainly focus on
processing time and size of the test video sequences. The computational time
and change of size of the encoded videos are also noted down after applying our
proposed scheme, AES-256, AES-192, AES-128, and DES. In Table 4, various
test sequences are compared in terms of bit rate, size after encoding and be-
fore encryption, and encoding time. These parameters form the base for Table
5, where we have compared our proposed scheme with the existing schemes in
terms of size (in MB) for various test sequences. In Table 5, unlike the exist-
ing encryption schemes, the test sequences perform efficiently and require less
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PeopleOnStreet 121.22 45.71 380.19
Kimono 23.41 18.29 168.56
Cactus 156.26 28.56 215
Rush Hour 64.92 30.72 203.77
Table 4: Comparison of Various Test Sequences
Test Sequence DES AES-128 AES-192 AES-256
Proposed
Scheme
PeopleOnStreet 49.36 50.14 50.15 50.24 45.86
Kimono 20.48 18.73 18.73 18.74 18.72
Cactus 31.99 36.56 36.56 36.57 28.57
Rush Hour 30.96 16.46 16.47 16.47 30.76
Table 5: Size (in MB) Comparison of various Test Sequences
memory using our proposed scheme.
The average computational time required to apply the above mentioned
encryption techniques is shown in Table 6. Each test sequence requires a specific
amount of time using these encryption techniques. All these test sequences, i.e.,
PeopleOnStreet, Kimono, Cactus, and Rush Hour require less computational
time to process, when our proposed scheme is applied. DES, on the other side,
requires ample amount of time to process. In case of AES with different key
sizes, the computational time increases with an increase in size of the key.
Performance graph of Figure 6 is based on the calculations of Tables 4 and 5.
As shown in these two tables and Figure 6, our proposed scheme keeps almost
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Test Sequence DES AES-128 AES-192 AES-256
Proposed
Scheme
PeopleOnStreet 2.14 0.75 0.86 0.95 0.92
Kimono 0.86 0.299 0.34 0.38 0.34
Cactus 1.34 0.47 0.54 0.59 0.58
Rush Hour 1.44 0.51 0.58 0.64 0.62
Table 6: Average Computational Time (Sec)
the same size of encoded video stream as that before the encryption, and other
schemes produce significant increase in the size. Performance graph of Figure
7 is based on the calculations of Table 6. As our proposed scheme is based
on AES-256, it is obvious from Table 6 and Figure 7 that it produces slightly
less time as compared to AES-256 but slightly increased time as compared to
AES-128 and AES-192 due to large keys. 1 
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Figure 7: Time Comparison
5. Conclusion
Encrypting secret data in compressed video streams is a relatively new re-
search area which is attracting the attention of researchers. This is primarily
due to privacy and security issues concerned with the public clouds. In this
article, a secured scheme has been presented which hides the secret data in
HEVC encoded video stream, i.e., in compressed domain. The proposed scheme
consists of three major phases, which are video encoding, data encryption, and
decryption with/without decoding. The proposed scheme tries to maintain the
original video stream size after encryption without affecting the visual quality of
video data. Thus, it produces an ideal platform for real-time video applications.
The secret data is distributed in encoded video stream so it is difficult for
hackers to extract entire secret data. This is due to the fact that hackers do
not know the exact locations and patterns of the hiding scheme, even if they
steal the secret key. Another major advantage is that our proposed scheme
fully supports the encoding and decoding structure of HEVC standard. The
video stream with encrypted secret data can easily be decoded without getting
corrupted or showing any sign of extra hidden information. Experimental results
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have shown that the proposed scheme maintains the visual quality with a slight
compromise on increasing the size of the encoded video stream.
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